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The standard three-state voter model is enlarged by including the outside
pressure favouring one of the three choices and by adding some biased internal
random noise. The Monte Carlo simulations are motivated by states with
the population divided into three groups of various affinities to each other.
We show the crucial influence of the boundaries for moderate lattice sizes like
500×500. By removing the fixed boundary at one side, we demonstrate that
this can lead to the victory of one single choice. Noise in contrast stabilizes
the choices of all three populations. In addition, we compute the persistence
probability, i.e., the number of sites who have never changed their opinion
during the simulation, and we consider the case of ”rigid-minded” decision
makers.
1 Motivation and Model
The political situation after the break-up of former communist powers and
the emergence of new sovereign states in Europe and elsewhere, justify yet
another look at linguistic practices as informed by geopolitical agendas with
the ever growing asymmetric power relations and the ongoing struggle for
the accumulation of linguistic and cultural capital. Pronounced language
asymmetries with highly competitive behaviour have caused a situation in
which no successor state can claim a one-and-only homogenous ”national
language” without serious caveats. In complex decision making, there are
typically no single agreements when large numbers of decision makers are
expected to choose from a large set of alternatives [1]. Any attempts to
tackle the intricacies of these phenomena at the more global level, stumble
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across a series of theoretical and methodological problems. However, more
recent studies have shown that if individuals tend to share similar knowledge
structures within a given choice domain, then a rather stable global choice
behaviour is observed with about 90% probability [2].
In the present study, we shift the analysis of geographical [3], linguistic,
sociological and political factors to another report [4], while looking here
for a model which may describe a type of language competition observed
in an environment populated by strong minorities facing several alternative
choices and partially bordering on supporting states. We do not intend to
discuss whether ”dialects” would be a better name instead of ”languages”,
however, we notice that recent linguistic analyses [5] could not trace any di-
alectal differences following national lines in many of the successor states in
e.g. Southeast Europe. Instead, it has been increasingly argued [6] that all
different groups in the region tend to use exactly the same idiom. However,
the restructured political pictures lead to the emergence of completely new
policies, such that the question of language has become a top political issue
in a community which is linguistically homogenous but politically divided [6].
We treat this problem as the one of opinion dynamics where everybody can
adopt one of the three choices A, B, and C (each representing the opinion
about the linguistic identity), with transitive [7] preference relations. Thus
we model the evolution of the global choice behaviour in a tripartite sys-
tem where due to particular economic and political alliances, languages may
happen to be in a closer contact at one point in time and more divided at
another. As a consequence, people may start adopting linguistic features or
even full languages of their neighbours, if they have sufficient gains or are in-
fluenced by a set of social and/or political factors. This is especially valid for
those languages which both belong to the same linguistic family and border
with one another.
In our model, we assume that the simulated L×L lattice is bordered on
top by the population preferring the linguistic choice A and on bottom by the
population preferring the choice C. This we achieve through two boundary
lines of only A on top and only C on bottom. Initially, in the middle of
the lattice, the decision makers (DM) preferring the choice B are dominant,
while on the top we have DM mostly preferring A and on the bottom mostly
preferring C, with the concentrations of A, B, and C varying linearly with
height. Figure 1 shows for L = 1000 the initial distribution of choices A, B,
and C as a function of height, i.e., we plot the numbers of A choices in each
horizontal line while doing the same for the B and C choices.
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Figure 1: Initial distribution of A, B and C as a function of height, with
concentrations varying linearly with height. Half of the people selects the B
choice (mostly in the middle), one quarter selects A (mostly near one border)
and one quarter selects the choice C (mostly near the other border).
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Figure 2: Double-logarithmic plot of B choices versus time in the simple
voter model.
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Figure 3: All three choices for the largest lattice in the simple voter model.
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Figure 4: A small amount of ”advertising” p in favour of B stabilises the
B choice; a larger p increases it, though not to 100 percent = 251001. No
”noise” is included yet.
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Figure 5: Addition of noise q to voter model plus advertising reduces fluc-
tuations.
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Figure 6: Dependence of B choice on lattice size, with small advertising and
small noise.
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Figure 7: Geographic distribution of A, B and C opinions after equilibration
as a function of the line number in the lattice; p = q = 10−5.
Opinion dynamics can be described in several different ways, by using
e.g. the models of Deffuant et al. [8], Krause and Hegselmann [9], Sznajd
[10], or some older approaches such as the model of Axelrod [11]. In the
present paper, the basic dynamics is the traditional voter model [12], where at
each iteration every site accepts the language of a randomly selected nearest
neighbour. Then every individual with choice A having three individuals
with choice B and one with A as neighbours is likely to give up the choice A
and shift to B. Instead of this voter model we also could have used a Potts-
type model [14], as did Lim et al. [3] without mentioning Potts, or an Ising
model with spin +1, 0,−1. The voter model, however, seems to be simpler,
and is a first step towards a more complete future work on this topic.
In addition, we assume that with low probability p at each iteration each
individual accepts the choice B because of ”advertising campaigns” [13] from
higher authority. Furthermore, we added noise to the whole process, in
order to mimic perturbations and random fluctuations in a person’s switching
behaviour among choice items over time due to e.g. mixed marriages, sudden
preference changes of latent origin, or other personal reasons of individual
DM. More precisely, with low probability q each individual at each iteration
shifts to another randomly selected choice: C shifts equally often to A and B,
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Figure 8: Two-dimensional distribution of the B opinion as a function of
time, with small noise and small advertising, p = q = 10−5.
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Figure 9: C is likely to win if rigid A boundary at A side is removed. For
smaller L this victory is more pronounced, for larger L less.
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Figure 10: Persistence: Number of sites which have not changed since the
beginning of the simulation. For longer times this number decays faster,
reaching zero before or near 20,000 iterations.
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Figure 11: Persistence: B choice if a random quenched fraction of 0.1, 1 and
10 % never changes in a 101× 101 lattice; p = q = 10−5. For comparison we
repeat from Fig. 6 the data without such a fraction (squares at the bottom).
B shifts to A three times more often than to C, and A shifts to B three times
more often than to C. We use this particular update rule for the opinion
dynamics because we wish to model a situation in which there is a virtual
i.e., political barrier splitting the lattice into two major pieces such that
C dominates on one side of the barrier, while A and B are predominantly
preferred on the other (e.g. through the separation into two political entities).
Furthermore, each of the three choices A, B, and C has some special property:
Only the population with B choice has no border with fixed sites, while
populations preferring A and C choices partially border on two areas from
which they sporadically obtain additional political support. In addition, C
choice is rather disliked by those individuals choosing A and B. Thus, we
assume that individuals’ information is not arbitrary but is constrained by
the individuals’ context-based mental model of the respective choice domain.
We further investigate the case in which one of the two fixed boundaries
in the model is removed (e.g. when the neighbouring side weakens or disrupts
its support), assuming that this might lead to the victory of one of the opinion
alternatives within the tripartite system. We also compute the persistence
probability s(k, t) for different lattice sizes, where k is the number of opinions
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in the original voter model, and p = q = 0.00001.
We do not take into account voluntary or forced migration of DM; nei-
ther have we included the factor proportional to the population size dynamics
(birth vs. death rates). Of course, the question of how exactly individuals
aggregate their preferences over k candidate languages involves much more
fine-granularity than considered in the present model. Indeed, the opinion
switching dynamics might be far more complex than described by the up-
date rule in the present study. For instance, not only single individuals, but
moreover, larger amounts of population members might drastically change
their attitudes towards linguistic (and political) campaigns such that they
no longer participate in the opinion switching process. Thus, they might just
”tune out” [15] at one or more points in time, thereby considerably affecting
the overall evolution of preferences or choices. At such times, the individual
state remains frozen, until a particular event causes the decision maker to re-
enter the switching process. In order to reflect on this type of behaviour in our
simulations, we included a situation in which a particular random (quenched)
fraction of population never changes its opinion (fixed set of ”stubborn” de-
cision makers). However, we assume here that some aspects of the human
opinion dynamics are independent of the detailed micro-processes of decision
making, relying more on some overall, universal properties. These micro-
scopic quantities are besides not always directly accessible to the observer.
On the other hand, there are macroscopic quantities, defined by parameters
that are fixed from the outside. The main goal of statistical physics is exactly
to provide a link between these microscopic and the more global, macroscopic
aspects of an investigated system.
2 Results
For the simple voter model without advertising and noise, Fig.2 shows how
the choice B decays due to the influence of the fixed boundaries with A and C
only. The larger the lattice, the longer does the B choice survive. The single
increasing curve for L = 501 shows the B choice if the two boundary lines
are all B, instead of all A and all C, respectively. This figure thus indicates
the importance of the lattice boundaries. For the same simple model but a
larger lattice, Fig.3 shows the time dependence of the A, B and C opinions.
If advertising in favour of B is added to the voter model, the B opinion can
be prevented from dying out and can even increase, enlarging thus its initial
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majority; see Fig.4. Very small advertising probabilities p > 105 suffice.
All following figures include both advertising with p = 10−5 and noise
with varying small q. Figure 5 shows that somewhat counter-intuitively, the
noise reduces the fluctuations if its strength q increases. For q = 0.1 already
the results agree well with theoretical expectations of 40 % A, 40% B, 20%
C, the stationary solution of the rate equations for noise only. Again, small
lattice sizes let the B opinion decay; however now it happens that after B has
died out it is resurrected via advertising and noise; see Fig.6. Fig.7 shows
what happens in the long run with the initial distribution of A, B and C,
as a function of the line number of the lattice. Fig.8 shows as a function of
time how the voter process first leads to clustering: A prefers to be near A,
B near B, and C near C. Later, the decrease in preference for the B opinion
is seen until it is stabilized by noise and advertising.
If the rigid boundary of pure A at one end is omitted, then both B and
A are strongly reduced and C wins for small L; see Fig.9.
The number of sites which never changed during a simulation decays
initially as about 1/t0.4 for t < 103, and then stronger down to zero, see Fig.
10 and straight line there. This power law differs from the behaviour of other
voter models with different noise or without noise [16].
If we assume a small fraction r of sites never to change, then they help
the B population to survive better, and for larger r they reduce fluctuations,
as seen in Fig.11.
3 Discussion
In the present paper, we proposed the generalization of the standard three-
state voter model for a linguistically homogenous but politically divided pop-
ulation with subgroups of different mutual affinities. Starting with this tri-
partite initial configuration, the Monte Carlo simulations were conducted for
different lattice sizes, different amounts of ”advertising” (outside pressure)
and asymmetric noise distribution. These simulations lead us to several,
non-trivial conclusions.
First, the individual preferences for the initially most dominant opinion
are more prone to decay given the rather unstable and fuzzy borders with
respect to the two other populations with more fixed boundaries and opinions
different from the majority. Thus, we found a substantial importance of
the boundary effects for the investigated population when placed on smaller
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lattices. However, increasing the size of the lattice prolongs the survival of
the most dominant opinion.
Second, adding some ”advertising” in favour of the dominance state pre-
vents the opinion of the majority from extinction, while considerably increas-
ing its size. In the model, the ”advertising” probabilities refer to the different
outside pressures of e.g. the international community in favor of the largest
population due to particular reasons. Somewhat counter-intuitively, when
noise was added to the process, it reduced the previously observed fluctua-
tions in choice behaviour. The noise parameter in our model can relate to a
set of different factors such as marriages and relationships between culturally
and linguistically different individuals, unexpected changes of preferences for
different political parties with different language policies, or other personal
reasons of individual decision makers.
In addition, we investigated a particular case of removing a rigid bound-
ary at one of the previously stable sides, thus yielding the victory of only
one single opinion for small lattice sizes (L = 301). The decay function for
individuals who never changed their opinion during the simulations, tends
to follow a power law which differs considerably from the behaviour docu-
mented in other studies of persistence probabilities, where different types of
noise were used or no noise was applied at all [15]. Finally, if for some reasons
a particular fraction r of population ”tunes out” from any further opinion
switching, this leads then to a better than the previously observed stabiliza-
tion of the most dominant state, with additional reductions of fluctuations
for larger r.
The update rule reported in this study was used in order to mimic situ-
ations in which three populations are not just geographically, but also vir-
tually, i.e., politically divided (e.g., via formation of two separate entities
following an inter-cultural conflict). Further research in this direction should
therefore include a situation where the political barrier is removed, thus ne-
cessitating different update rules in the model.
Our investigation was motivated by a phenomenon in which three groups
of a given population speak one and the same language (linguistic homogene-
ity), but have different opinions about their own linguistic identity (political
diversity), thus each claiming to speak different language from the ”other”.
In such situations, the name which people usually attach to ”their language”
is the one of their supporting neighbouring or other states. As a consequence,
individuals can increasingly start to adopt linguistic features from languages
of their supporting neighbours, especially if they were previously in a conflict
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with their within-population neighbouring members. If no supporting neigh-
bouring states are available, people will try to invent or dig up half-forgotten
words that function as shibboleths (dialect identifiers). Eventually, certain
aspects of pronunciation that people are conscious of could be changed ”by
decision”, while grammar is expected to remain unaffected, since people are
not conscious of most of the grammar they use. Indeed, as recent scientific
studies have shown, an immensely large fraction of our everyday behaviour
is unconscious, i.e., zombie-like [17], and consequentially, under rather un-
certain conditions, we tend to act more as irrational decision makers [18].
For instance, one opinion might often be preferred to another, even if the
probability of yielding the worse outcome with it is one. Often irrational and
particularly politically-driven ”swings” cause people to make more (unnec-
essary) decisions about their language and the language of others. From the
linguistic perspective, one can predict in the aforementioned case that only
highly salient linguistic features can change more rapidly.
People can start adopting other linguistic features or even fully switch to
other languages due to many reasons: due to the use of different languages
for different purposes (diglossia), because they decide to migrate to a for-
eign country, because the status of the non-native language is higher, or if
their country is conquered by the linguistically different population. How-
ever, it was demonstrated that contrary to predictions of some models [19],
a stable co-existence of languages in competition, regardless of their status,
is still possible if they are sufficiently similar to each other [20]. Typical in-
stances of such ”linguistic areas” where several languages compete and share
a number of features are found in Southeast Europe [4]. For example, in
the region of Sanjak, several different languages share many of their fea-
tures. The area of Sanjak is politically divided between the states of Serbia
and Montenegro, and geographically and linguistically surrounded by four
different states or areas (Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo-
Metohia). In parts with Bosniak population in Sanjak, individual speakers
claim to speak Bosnian language, however, the laws in Serbia allow Bosnian
only as an ”elective” in primary and secondary education, while Montene-
grins ”solved” this ”problem” by labeling the language exclusively as ”mother
tongue” without any reference to any particular national language. Most re-
cently, the new Montenegrin constitution introduced the new and the official
Montenegrin language in the country, with other languages (Bosnian, Ser-
bian, Albanian and Croatian) as additional, but secondary official languages
of the state. This was preceded by a high disagreement about how the offi-
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cial language should be called, with competing opinions between those who
viewed themselves as of different cultural and ethnic origins.
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, we have a related case, where strong minorities
decided to introduce the standard languages of the neighbouring countries as
their official idioms [6]. It seems therefore that individuals, and more impor-
tantly, much larger population clusters, indeed tend to consciously introduce
several novel features in their languages just to distinguish themselves from
”others”. As we have found in our simulations, the final outcome of this
process might strongly depend upon the character of the boundaries defined
between different areas, but also on the size of the populated region, the inter-
nal random noise, and the outside pressure from some higher authority. We
also wish to stress at this point that despite of the obvious structural similar-
ity and mutual intelligibility of many of the Southeast European languages,
these two factors should not be taken as decisive (or misused) in language
planning or policy making, especially because some other world languages
are mutually intelligible to a large degree just as e.g. Croatian and Bosnian
(such as Urdu and Hindi), but are recognized as separate standard languages.
A counterexample to the Bosnian case would be Estonian, where the
placement of verbs at the end of sentences was consciously avoided in order to
differentiate the language from German, a language which it had been under
the influence of. But this was of course an attempt guided by linguists. It is in
fact not quite clear whether the word order had been influenced from German
or whether verb-final order was just a natural, internal Estonian development.
Somewhat more cooperatively, in the northwest Amazon region, there is a
marriage system according to which people have to marry someone speaking
a language that is different from their own: linguistic exogamy. Thus, the
language which defines your identity is that of your father. In this situation
people are careful not to borrow words from other languages, but they have
influenced one another at the level of grammar to a great extent.
Explanations for provocative phenomena of this kind are best investigated
within the framework of opinion dynamics; the voter model is a traditional
example and is a good place to begin. We believe that further refinements
and applications of our generalized voter model, carried over more realis-
tic input while simultaneously considering a more complex set of intervening
variables, might tease apart the multiple forces (latent) and practices (observ-
ables) through which individual decision makers shift to other languages or
opinions. This can further shed light on the related psychological mechanisms
responsible for integration and preference dynamics of these practices. For
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example, from the psychological point of view, one can investigate whether
some collective phenomena of this type are better explained by means of
modeling the individual indifference classes rather than preferences among
various choices [21]. Thus, in rather conflicting and culturally highly mixed
areas, agents are usually better aware of what they don’t like, then what
would they prefer more.
Additionally, more degrees of freedom of individual ”voters” (using com-
plex networks instead of lattices, allowing for a co-evolution of the network
and voter states), as well as migratory processes and population size dy-
namics should be incorporated in future modeling. It would also be ideal
to integrate the opinion dynamics models with those of language evolution
and learning [22, 23]. Models of opinion dynamics can also help in future
conflict resolution in the aforementioned regions, by suggesting e.g. possible
modes of ”softer” and scientifically-valid language policies, or by (re)defining
particular linguistic norms as opposed to those driven by political factors.
We finally argue that the advantages of our generalized three-state voter
model span beyond mere linguistic applications, since the model is able to
simulate and characterize the nature of both collective political and linguistic
states (i.e. their co-evolution). Moreover, through future comparison with
realistic data, we might be able to predict whether and under which condi-
tions various highly-similar languages can stably co-exist, and whether and
how the political stability in a given region changes with the ever growing
”linguistic diversity”. Physicists and other computational modelers can sig-
nificantly contribute to this research domain, by developing tools capable of
establishing more isomorphic relations between the model parameters and
the realistic traits of languages or opinions in competition.
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